THE
O’CONNOR
JUDICIAL
SELECTION PLAN

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR (RET.)
United States Supreme Court

&

IAALS
The Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System

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The Quality Judges Initiative serves to advance empirically informed models for choosing, evaluating, and retaining judges that preserve impartiality and accountability in the civil justice system.
Dear Reader,

For the last several years, I have worked closely with IAALS and the Advisory Committee to its Quality Judges Initiative to promote processes for selecting and retaining state judges that inspire public trust in our courts and the integrity of their decisions.

In our view, the O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan best achieves these ends. The O’Connor Plan calls for commission-based gubernatorial appointment of judges, with performance evaluation and periodic retention elections.

With this publication, we offer recommendations for structuring each stage of the selection process to encourage highly qualified individuals to apply for judgeships, assure that the best judicial candidates are selected and retained, and engender support for the judiciary from the other two branches. These recommendations are based on IAALS’ and other research.

As an example, the O’Connor Plan suggests that more than one entity should select the members of the judicial nominating commission. After receiving a commission’s nominees, the governor should have a finite period of time in which to make the appointment. Voters in retention elections should have access to nonpartisan information about the judges on the ballot. Evaluations of judges’ performance should focus on the legal analysis, clarity, and fairness of their decisions instead of the outcome of their decisions.

In recent years, I have been distressed to see persistent efforts in some states to politicize the bench and the role of our judges. This Plan is a step toward developing systems that prioritize the qualifications and impartiality of judges, while still building in tools for accountability through an informed election process. Our recommendations here can help states set a course toward improving and refining their processes, and, ultimately, strengthening their judiciary. We all must seek to achieve those goals, because the courts are the bulwark of our democracy and we can ill afford to see them undermined.

Sincerely,

Sandra Day O’Connor
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Introduction

IAALS, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, has a deep and abiding interest in protecting the quality and integrity of the judiciary. To that end, IAALS formed our Quality Judges Initiative in 2007. IAALS has worked closely with an extremely qualified Advisory Committee chaired by United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.).

With her assistance, and based upon IAALS’ independent research and compilation of existing research, IAALS and Justice O’Connor have identified a model for judicial selection that we believe best balances the dual goals of impartiality and accountability.

This four-part model includes: 1) Screening and nomination of applicants from an open field by a commission that is politically balanced and that includes a majority of non-attorneys; 2) Appointment from among those nominees by the sitting governor of the state; 3) Robust evaluation of the judge by individuals who appear before him or her and circulation of that information to voters; and 4) Retention election on a regular basis in which all voters may cast an informed vote for or against the judge, with the benefit of the evaluation data.

The O’Connor Advisory Committee is comprised of:

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.), Honorary Chair
Chief Justice Ruth V. McGregor (Ret.), Chair
Meryl Chertoff, Director, Justice and Society Program, The Aspen Institute
Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, President Emeritus, Florida State University
Senator Bob Graham, United States Senate, 1987–2005
Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, Partner, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Executive Director, IAALS

Maureen E. Schafer, Chief Corporate Development Officer, LifeNexus, Inc.
Keith Swisher, Associate Dean of Scholarship and Associate Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law
Larry D. Thompson, Executive Vice President – Government Affairs, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary, PepsiCo, Inc.
H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Partner and Founding Member, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC
Governor Christine Todd Whitman, New Jersey, 1994 – 2001
Mary G. Wilson, Past President, League of Women Voters of the United States

We were honored to have the late Thomas Moyer, Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, as one of the original members of the Advisory Committee.
Core Values in the Judiciary

As a prerequisite to the development of a recommended model for judicial selection, we identified and defined as Core Values the desired attributes of a judge and of a judicial system. IAALS, Justice O’Connor, and the Advisory Committee asked a diverse group of experts—including federal and state judges, academics who study judicial selection, and practicing lawyers who have a role in selecting judges—what they expected from judges and from court systems, with the assumption that those individuals were presenting (as plaintiff or defense) a case that was important to them. The Core Values that we list here comprise the information we gleaned from that inquiry.

Values Desired in Individual Judges

Fairness and Impartiality.

Judges must be fundamentally fair and impartial.
Judges must approach each case with an open mind.
Judges must eschew actual bias and the appearance of bias.
Judges must be willing to reconsider personal points of view.
Judges must be honest and even-handed.

Competence.

Judges must have excellent analytical ability.
Judges must demonstrate excellent substantive legal knowledge, or a willingness to learn at the earliest opportunity.
Judges must undertake the research necessary to gain command of the facts and issues presented.

Judicial Philosophy.

Judges must be principled and intellectually curious.
Judges must be collaborative and open to new learning to achieve deliberative excellence.
Judges must recognize the impact and consequences of a decision but not allow these factors to drive the decision.
Judges must appreciate stability in law and precedent, while recognizing the need for change.
Judges must have sufficient decisional independence to decide issues in ways that contravene majority opinion, if such decisions are consistent with existing law.

Productivity and Efficiency.

Judges must attend to tasks.
Judges must demonstrate a strong work ethic.
Judges must strive to achieve timely docket management without sacrificing due process.
Clarity.
Judges must have excellent written and oral communication skills.
Judges must communicate in a straightforward and precise manner, and provide reasoning for decisions.

Demeanor and Temperament.
Judges must be patient and even-keeled.
Judges must be collegial and humble.
Judges must be respectful and courteous.
Judges must command respect from the community and from those who enter the courthouse.
Judges must work to make the courtroom a comfortable place for those who enter it, while acting as necessary to maintain appropriate respect and decorum at all times.

Community.
Judges must share the fundamental values to which communities should aspire—values such as respect for individual rights, democratic government, and the rule of law.
Judges must be members of their community—not completely isolated from them.
Judges must be encouraged to engage in community service activities when those activities do not contravene or appear to contravene their decisional independence.
Judge must take an active role in the community to promote the values and principles of the judicial system.
Judges must build public understanding of the legal system and public confidence in the judicial branch through appropriate communications and attendance at community events.

Separation of Politics from Adjudication.
Judges must not engage in partisan politics, which threatens independent decision-making and erodes public confidence in the judicial system.

The sections on core values—both for what we want in judges and in court systems—represent an important contribution to the public dialogue and reflect conversation among practitioners and scholars from very different points on the political spectrum. They show that there are some values we all share when we think about our judges and courts.

Meryl Chertoff
Director, Justice and Society Program
The Aspen Institute
The best defense against threats to judicial independence is a culture in which citizens appreciate and respect the role of impartial courts in upholding the rule of law; in which they recognize that the defense of the unpopular is a part of what makes our judiciary the envy of the world. The key to creating such a culture is education.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
Philadelphia Bar Association
June 2013

VALUES DESIRED IN COURT SYSTEMS

Commitment to Public Service.
Judges and court staff must ensure their actions as public servants align with the best interests of the public.

Transparency.
Judges and court staff must make opinions, orders, and court statistics publicly available and accessible, except where the circumstances of individual cases warrant confidentiality.
Judicial performance evaluations must be accessible to the public, partly as a means of educating citizens about the role of the courts and the expectations courts and judges have for their own performance.

Accountability.
Courts must commit to continuous improvement in their service to the public.
Courts must hold themselves accountable to the public to provide a fair and efficient adjudicative process.
Courts must work to remedy their processes if considered to be unfair, inefficient, or too costly by a substantial portion of the public.
Voters must have the opportunity to hold courts accountable for their overall performance.

Accessibility.
Courts must be accessible to all, and each party should have a day in court if so desired.
Courts must not be perceived to be unavailable to potential litigants or the public.

Fair, Efficient, and Predictable Process.
Courts must be as committed to the fairness and predictability of procedures as they are to the fairness and predictability of outcomes.
Litigants must feel that they had the opportunity to be heard before the decision was rendered.
Individual judge procedures must not be so different from those of other judges that these variations encourage forum shopping.

Respect for Demographics/Social Makeup of Community.
The overall makeup of the court must reflect respect for the community it serves. Those responsible for selecting judges should be mindful of this.
This does not mean that the race, gender, or ethnicity of the judges must be perfectly proportionate to the demographics of the community (although such factors might be among those considered). It does mean, however, that every judge in the courthouse should be cognizant of the community that he or she serves.
The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan

We turn now to the four components of the O’Connor Plan, and our recommendations as to the elements of each. These recommendations are based upon the compiled information and experience available to IAALS, Justice O’Connor, and the Advisory Committee, and comprise a system that is designed to produce judges and courts that fulfill the Core Values.

Judicial Nominating Commissions

Nominating commissions are at the front end of the process. They should be the screening entity that identifies the list of final candidates for the Governor. Their structure and composition must provide a climate that fosters public confidence in the process while encouraging highly qualified applicants to apply. They must not be a political or partisan entity and should be representative of the community to be served by the judge. Our recommendations for the elements that comprise an effective nominating commission are taken primarily from existing nominating commission processes that we offer as better practices:

To ensure the stability of the process, nominating commissions should be constitutionally based.

The number of nominating commissions in a state may vary, but at the very least, there should be an appellate nominating commission and one or more trial court nominating commissions.

Multiple appointing authorities should select nominating commission members. This bolsters public confidence in the commission’s independence by making it less likely that a majority of the members will be appointed by a single entity.

In order to assure that the public viewpoint is well represented, a nominating commission should include a majority of non-attorney members who have a range of professional backgrounds and personal experience. Nominating commissions must not be viewed as captive to attorney groups.

Nominating commissions should be balanced politically, ideologically, and demographically. Race/ethnic, gender, and geographical diversity among commission members should be encouraged, if not required.

Members of nominating commissions must receive training so that they understand their role, and the role, responsibilities, and duties of judicial officers.

Nominating commission proceedings should reflect openness and transparency, carefully balancing the applicants’ need for confidentiality with the public’s right to know.

The respective terms of commission members should be staggered so that no one leadership group has a predominant voice. Staggered terms also prevent complete turnover in the commission’s membership, which provides new members with the benefit of existing members’ experience and ensures rotation among appointing authorities.

There should be a default provision in place should the nominating commission fail to act.
Gubernatorial Appointment

At this point in the process, the sitting Governor is able to exercise his or her preference among the nominees. That decision may, indeed, have partisan overtones because it is being made by an elected official who has a particular approach to judicial appointments. If the nominating commission has done its job, all nominees will be well qualified for the position. It is important that the nominating process be honored and that the Governor’s choice be limited to nominees whose names come from that process. Furthermore, a finite time for the appointment is important so as to avoid the possible ‘limbo’ of nominations that stretch on indefinitely and become political bargaining chips. A finite time also assures that the nominees themselves are able to continue their practice, or their current position, with only a limited period of uncertainty. Accordingly, we recommend these three elements of the gubernatorial appointment process as better practices:

The Governor should be given an appropriately limited number of nominees for each position, and a limited time in which to make the appointment.

There should be a default provision in place should the Governor fail to act timely.

The Governor should not be allowed to make an appointment outside of the list of recommended nominees.

Appointing judges is one of the most important responsibilities of a governor. In making judicial appointments, the governor should prioritize the qualifications of potential appointees over partisan considerations. The O’Connor Plan accomplishes this goal through a process that allows a nominating commission to screen nominees, on a bipartisan basis, and then give the governor the ultimate choice.

Governor
Christine Todd Whitman
New Jersey, 1994–2001
Judicial Performance Evaluation

This is the point in the process where accountability plays a role. Most Americans undergo job evaluations, and there is no reason why judges should not do the same. On the other hand, the data must be broad and deep and the inquiries must be about procedural fairness, demeanor, and knowledge—not about particular outcomes in individual cases. We offer these better practices as our recommendations for effective judicial performance evaluation:

Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE) programs should be created by constitution or statute, rather than by a rule or directive.

JPE programs should publically disseminate regular evaluations of the performance of individual judges, based on criteria generally understood to be characteristics of a good judge:

- Command of relevant substantive law and procedural rules
- Impartiality and freedom from bias
- Clarity of oral and written communications
- Judicial temperament that demonstrates appropriate respect for everyone in the courtroom
- Administrative skills, including competent docket management
- Appropriate public outreach

JPE of appellate judges should include a process for evaluating the legal reasoning and analysis, fairness, and clarity of a selection of the judge’s written opinions, without regard to the particular outcomes reached.

Evaluations should be completed by people who have interacted with the judges in the courtroom and in the office.

The entity responsible for administrating the JPE process should be viewed as independent from other entities in performing its role. It should not be affiliated with the judicial branch.

Like judicial nominating commissions, the members of a judicial performance evaluation commission should be selected by multiple appointing authorities and be comprised of a majority of lay members. It should reflect diversity, be politically, ideologically, and geographically balanced, and the terms of its members should be staggered.

As part of JPE, judges should receive regular training. In addition to basic and broad judicial education, education programs should be tailored to the extent possible to the areas in which judges have been found wanting in their respective performance evaluations.
RETENTION ELECTIONS

This is the point in the process where the voters have their say about judges. We do not recommend that elections be contested and partisan, but we endorse the opportunity for citizens to make their choice. The compromise is a retention election in which the judges are ‘retained’ in office or not on the basis of the vote of the electorate. Judicial performance evaluation plays a crucial role in providing voters with objective and broad-based information about the judge’s performance—information that is often lacking in judicial elections, especially when they are highly politicized. While JPE has purpose in self-improvement and feedback to individual judges, its primary purpose is to allow voters to cast informed votes when the judges appear on their ballots. Accordingly, we recommend these elements of the retention election process as better practices:

Retention elections are the final, critical piece of a selection system that embraces the core judicial values listed above. Accountability of judges to the public is the pivotal part of this approach to judicial selection.

Judges do not run against opponents; they do not run on party lines; they do not (except in extraordinary circumstances) need to raise money or make stump speeches that may affect their impartiality or the appearance of impartiality.

However, they do need to stand for election before the public whom they serve.

That voter base must have ready access to the JPE information that allows each voter to cast an informed vote about the judge—based upon his or her actual performance on the bench.

In retention elections, judges stand for retention after a provisional term of two to three years. This allows for the collection of sufficient data about the judge’s performance.

Judges’ terms of office vary after that, so JPE data collection should be continuing and as frequent as possible to coincide with the judge’s respective term.

This four-part Plan is a suggestion. It is based upon information about processes in various states, but is ultimately the recommendation of IAALS, the members of the Advisory Committee, and Justice O’Connor. We do not offer it as perfect; no selection system is. As its proponents, we offer the O’Connor Plan as an alternative that protects impartiality of the judiciary by insulating judges from campaign fundraising and campaign promises, yet still ensures accountability. Ultimately, what we all want is the best qualified judges sitting on the courts of this nation, as that is how the courts can best serve as protectors and defenders of our individual liberties and of our way of life. We must all muster our best efforts to, in turn, protect and defend them.

Businesses today are fast becoming the largest contributors to judicial candidates. Support of the O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan eliminates campaign investment in contested judicial elections, ensures a fair, accessible, and transparent court, and ultimately encourages and sustains a strong and vibrant business environment.

Maureen E. Schafer
Chief Corporate Development Officer
LifeNexus, Inc.
The O’Connor Plan in the States

States that use the O’Connor Plan to select and retain judges:

In 7 states (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah), all four components of the O’Connor Plan are used in selecting and retaining at least some judges.

In 3 states (Alaska, Colorado, Utah), all four components are used in selecting and retaining all judges.

In 3 states (Arizona, Missouri, Tennessee), all four components are used in selecting and retaining appellate court judges and, with the exception of Tennessee, some trial court judges.

In 1 state (New Mexico), the governor’s appointee may be challenged in a partisan election, followed by subsequent retention elections.

States that use some, but not all, components of the O’Connor Plan:

In 33 states and the District of Columbia, a commission-based appointment process (i.e., the first two components of the O’Connor Plan) is used to select at least some judges.

In 22 states and D.C., a commission-based appointment process is always used to select most or all judges.

In 6 states that use partisan or nonpartisan elections to select judges, a commission-based appointment process is used only to fill vacancies that occur between elections.

In 5 states, a judicial nominating commission advises the governor in making judicial appointments, but the governor is not required by law to appoint a commission-recommended candidate.

Of the 22 states that use a commission-based appointment process to select most or all judges, 16 states use periodic retention elections to retain judges.

In 17 states and the District of Columbia, there is an official program for evaluating judicial performance.

As discussed above, in 7 states performance evaluation results are provided to voters for use in retention elections.

In 3 states and the District of Columbia, performance evaluation results are provided to those responsible for reappointing judges.

In 2 states, summary performance evaluation results (i.e., individual judges are not identified) are provided to the public to enhance confidence in the courts.

In 5 states, performance evaluations are provided only to individual judges for the purpose of self-improvement.
Specific State Practices

To illustrate the O’Connor Plan in action, we highlight some similarities and differences in its operation in the seven states where it is in place.

Judicial Nominating Commissions:

In Arizona and Utah, the Governor appoints all members of the Commission, with attorney members chosen from candidates recommended by the State Bar. In other states, a combination of entities—which may include the Governor, the State Bar, the Chief Justice, and legislative leaders—appoints Commission members.

In Arizona and Colorado, a majority of Commission members are non-lawyers, and in Utah, the Commission may have a non-lawyer majority.

Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah require partisan balance among Commission members.

In five O’Connor Plan states—Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, New Mexico, and Tennessee—some aspects of the Commission’s screening process are open to the public.

Gubernatorial Appointment:

In O’Connor Plan states, the Governor has a limited time—ranging from 15 days in Colorado to 60 days in Arizona, Missouri, and Tennessee—to make a judicial appointment after receiving the Commission’s list of nominees.

If the Governor fails to do so, most states authorize the Chief Justice to make the appointment, but in Missouri, that responsibility falls to the Judicial Nominating Commission.

In New Mexico and Tennessee, the Governor may request that the Commission submit a second panel of nominees.

Utah is the only O’Connor Plan state in which Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointments is required.

Judicial Performance Evaluation:

Arizona is the only state with a constitutionally authorized JPE program; in other O’Connor Plan states, programs are authorized by statute or court rule.

JPE programs for trial court judges include courtroom observation in Alaska, Colorado, and Utah. Programs for appellate court judges include written opinion review in Colorado, Missouri, New Mexico, and Tennessee.

In Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah, judges are evaluated at least twice per term—mid-term to facilitate self-improvement and pre-retention election to inform voters.

Self-Improvement: In Arizona and Colorado, judges write their own performance improvement plans, approved by the Commissions, for areas in which their evaluations show problems.
Retention Elections:

Terms of Office: In O’Connor Plan states, judges serve a short initial term—typically at least one to three years—before standing for retention for a full term. The length of a full term varies from state to state and by level of court.

Term lengths for judges of major trial courts range from four years in Arizona to eight years in Tennessee. Trial court judges in the other O’Connor Plan states have six-year terms.

Judges of intermediate appellate courts serve terms ranging from six years in Arizona and Utah to twelve years in Missouri. Term lengths for intermediate appellate court judges are eight years in the other O’Connor Plan states.

Term lengths for Supreme Court justices range from six years in Arizona to twelve years in Missouri. In New Mexico and Tennessee, justices serve eight-year terms; in Alaska, Colorado, and Utah, justices serve ten-year terms.

In O’Connor Plan states, judges who wish to campaign for retention must establish a campaign committee to fundraise and seek public statements of support on their behalf. In Alaska, Colorado, Missouri, and Utah, judges may not mount a campaign unless there is active opposition to their retention; in Arizona, New Mexico, and Tennessee, no such restrictions are in place.

Thus, even states that use a merit selection system to select judges should scrutinize their plans to preserve what is essential to judicial independence and reform those aspects of the plan that are expendable and might otherwise endanger the whole.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
Missouri Law Review
June 2009
Additional Resources

Judicial Nominating Commissions in the States
Nominating commissions are used in selecting at least some judges in many states around the country. This resource tracks the nominating commissions in the states and links to detailed information about each state’s program.
Available at http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/implementation/judicial-nominating-commission

Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States
Judicial performance evaluation exists in many states as an official program. This resource tracks these programs and contains detailed information about each of them.
Available at http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/implementation/judicial-performance-evaluation

An Uncommon Dialogue: What Do We Want in Our Judges & How Do We Get There?
In March of 2013, IAALS sponsored “An Uncommon Dialogue” about judicial selection. IAALS convened a group of ideologically and experientially diverse legal experts for two days to share perspectives on essential attributes for judges and how to put judges with those attributes on the bench.
Available at http://iaals.du.edu/initiatives/quality-judges-initiative/research/an-uncommon-dialogue

Transparent Courthouse®: A Blueprint for Judicial Performance Evaluation
This publication provides useful tools to aid jurisdictions interested in establishing or improving a judicial performance evaluation program for trial court judges.
Available at http://iaals.du.edu/library/publications/transparent-courthouse-a-blueprint-for-judicial-performance-evaluation

Recommended Tools for Evaluating Appellate Judges
This publication provides useful tools to aid jurisdictions interested in establishing or improving a judicial performance evaluation program for appellate court judges.
Available at http://iaals.du.edu/library/publications/recommended-tools-for-evaluating-appellate-judges